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Abstract 
Many simulators today contain traditional 
opponents and lack an asymmetric insurgent style 
adversary. InsurgiSim prototypes an embeddable 
testbed containing a threat network of agents that one 
can easily configure and deploy for training and 
analysis purposes. The insurgent network was 
constructed inside a socio-cognitive agent framework 
(FactionSim-PMFserv) that includes: (a) a synthesis of 
best-of-breed models of personality, culture, values, 
emotions, stress, social relations, mobilization, as well 
as (b) an IDE for authoring and managing reusable 
archetypes and their task-sets (Sect. 2). Agents and 
markups in this library are not scripted, and act to 
follow their values and fulfill their needs. So it’s 
desirable to profile the agents (eg, faction leaders, cell 
logisticians, followers, bomb maker, financier, 
recruiter, etc.) as faithfully to the real world as possible. 
Doing this will improve the utility of InsurgiSim for 
studying what may be driving the insurgent agents in a 
given area of operation as Sect. 3 explains. 
InsurgiSim’s bridge is an HLA federate and can be 
embedded to drive all or some of the insurgent agents in 
a 3rd party simulator.  Three such examples are 
summarized in Sect.4. The paper closes with next steps 
to improve InsurgiSim’s capabilities and utility. 
 
1) Introduction 
As the nation faces 21st century adversaries and 
national security challenges, traditional military actions 
alone such as sorties flown, rounds fired, or tons of 
relief materials delivered, are proving less and less 
likely to guarantee the desired outcome unless 
complementary behavioral solutions are also 
considered. The alternative is to focus strategically on 
the desired outcome, study the adversary’s likely 
behavior, and explore alternative ways to affect the 
desired result.  This concept of better understanding and 
influencing potential adversaries (and friends) is central 
to the needs of diplomacy and national policy making. 
It is consistent also with the military’s need to shift to a 
new paradigm where they consider all the “effects” of 
various actions as well as alternative pathways to 
“effect” the same outcome. This is coming to be labeled 
as effects based operations (EBO) or actions: e.g., see 
McCrabb & Caroli (2001), Pendall (2004). When we 
take actions, make commitments or issue utterances, 
what are the behaviors of targeted and other leaders 
likely to be, especially those influenced and constrained 
by many sub-groups and special interests? As Smith 
(2003) points out, EBO needs to focus on how we can 
“shape the adversary’s thinking and behavior, rather 
than on simply defeating his forces.” Unfortunately, as 
Caroli et al (2004) point out, most wargames include 
traditional threats and there are very few tools available 
to help understand how leaders and other adversaries 
behave, that capture what is in their hearts and minds, 
and that can be used to understand what might 
influence their behavior and effect the outcomes we 
desire. There is a  need to convert wargames so they 
offer the proper training and/or analysis capabilities. 
 
1.1) Theories of Insurgency/Terrorism 
A number of theories currently exist about the 
roots of insurgent and terrorist movements, how they 
grow, and how recruitment might work (and be 
hindered) – e.g., see Borum (2004)’s review of instinct, 
drive, social learning, and cognitive theories as well as 
Collier (2007)’s review of economic greed and poverty 
based theories. Many of these are ‘paper-based’ 
theories with survey and event data to support them. 
But these theories have not been implemented within a 
detailed socio-cognitive agent-based modeling and 
simulation framework such as we present here. 
Implementation is valuable since it serves to test the 
theories, expose their strengths and weaknesses, and 
uncover gaps in behavior that the theories do not 
explain. In general, science is often advanced by a 
combination of reductive analysis and synthetic usage. 
The goal of this effort is on the latter. Specifically, we 
have been constructing a testbed to research and 
possibly merge different terrorist and insurgency 
theories. We believe this testbed serves a second 
purpose of providing a toolset that can be embedded  to 
alter and extend traditional wargames as Caroli et al 
mention. We demonstrate both of these goals in this 
paper. 
 To begin, one can readily envision an insurgency 
existing in a world where a number of factions or clans 
range across the spectrum from those desiring the rule- 
of-law to those interested in chaos and regime change 
for any of a variety of reasons (ethno-political 
grievance, greed, crime, etc.). This is depicted across 
the top of Figure 1. Indeed, in the Maoist theory of 
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armed struggle, the preparatory stage of an insurgency 
is characterized by actions that seek to affect separate 
factions of the population of the nations or regions they 
are trying to influence, causing different factions to 
iterate (dynamically) through several states ranging 
from animosity and paralyzing fear to sympathy and 
membership in the insurgent movement (Griffith, 
1961). 
 Ideally one would like to realistically simulate such 
behaviors for the purposes of being able to train against 
it and analyze what influences it in a given area of 
operation. To train/analyze how to coopt the agenda of 
an insurgency and mobilize the populace toward the 
rule of law one needs a set of simulated factions and 
insurgent agents readily adapted to any given region. 
Since members of a given populace will be at varying 
degrees of support for and participation with each side, 
this implies that the aim of counter insurgency is not 
solely to destroy groups at the enemy end of the 
spectrum, but also to progressively shift individuals and 
groups closer to the friendly end. In fact, since 
insurgent cells are often hidden amongst supporting 
members of the population (bottom of Figure 1), a 
focus strictly on reaction to insurgent attacks can be 
counter-productive. It will leave the agenda in their 
hands, cause collateral damage to potentially woo-able 
factions, and make the force for order seem to have no 
successful agenda of its own. Instead one must 
encourage the force for order to use a ‘full spectrum’ of 
approaches to help diagnose the source of grievance, 
attempt to ameliorate the root causes, and build up 
whatever services and institutions that are lacking and 
potentially also causing discontent: eg., see USMC 
(2006), Kilcullen (2006), Patraeus (2006), Nagl (2002), 
Chiarelli (2005). 
 
Figure 1 – Factions and Agents in an Insurgent Area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 If we were to create a cast of digital archetypes, say 
for Iraq as an example of a wide array of characters that 
might appear in many scenarios, we might be talking 
about archetypes of varying ages and genders covering 
moderate and extreme Sunnis, Shi’ites, and Kurds, as 
well as extremist Infiltrating Arabs, and of course 
unsuspecting civilian victims (contractors, NGO types, 
press corp, etc.). One could presumably use these to 
craft scenarios relevant to a range of locales, 
particularly if some of the archetypes also included 
various regional leader types, specific types of holy 
sites, hot houses, and other situational triggers. But how 
should we craft the archetypes of the various groups 
and leaders? What would make them legitimate? What 
would make them easily reconfigured for a new locale? 
How could an analyst or a scenario or training 
developer use them one day to recreate a Fallujah that 
probably can be won only at intolerable costs; the next 
day to construct a hunt for an Al Sadr type who is 
hiding in a religious site surrounded by his angry 
followers; a third day for chasing Taliban or Al Quaeda 
renegades through the foothills of Afghanistan 
populated by indifferent or hostile warlords and tribal 
members; or a fourth day to mock up the impact on the 
populace and on peacekeeping of the press release of 
news of Abu Grabin style prisoner mistreatments? The 
list goes on. 
 
2) Socio-Cognitive Agents 
In this paper we pose the question of how well can 
the field of modeling and simulation (M&S) recreate 
insurgent operations such as just described? 
Specifically, we are particularly interested in the 
insurgency landscape as a complex social system and 
hence we want to explore the question of what can 
agent-based simulation offer? That is, if we use agents 
to help model the ‘parts’ and their micro-decision 
processes, can we observe macro-behaviors emerging 
that are useful for analysts and trainees to know about? 
Finally, if we want to model and simulate a social 
system from the bottom up, then it seems that we need 
to approach it with agent technology that covers both 
the social processes that influence people as well as 
cognitive processes that people use in reasoning and 
emoting over their fates. That is, we are curious about 
what can ‘socio-cognitive’ agents offer to the study of 
sub-state actors and/or stressed social systems? 
Observes 
Populace
Media 
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Recruiter 
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 Sun (2004) provides a useful survey of the 
respective fields of social agents and cognitive agents 
and shows that there are very few environments that 
straddle both topics to provide socio-cognitive 
architectures. In this paper, we therefore illustrate one 
such architecture and provide some insights into how it 
works, what it is useful for, and whether its outputs 
provide any validity for training and analysis. 
 
2.1) Social Framework: FactionSim  
FactionSim is a tool where you set up a conflict 
scenario in which the factional leader and follower 
agents all run autonomously. You are the sole human 
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player interacting to try and use a set of DIME 
(Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and/or Economic) 
actions to influence outcomes and PMESII (Political, 
Military, Economic, Social, Informational, or 
Infrastructure) effects. Factions are modeled where 
each has a leader, two sub-faction leaders (loyal and 
fringe), a set of starting resources (Economy, E, 
Security, S, and Politics, P), and a representative set of 
N follower agents. A leader is assumed to manage his 
faction’s E- and S- tanks so as to appeal to his followers 
and to each of the other tribes or factions he wants in 
his alliance. Each of the leaders of those factions, 
however, will similarly manage their own E and S 
assets in trying to keep their sub-factions and 
memberships happy. Followers determine the level of 
the P-tank by voting their membership level (a topic 
discussed in PMFserv). A high P-tank means that there 
are more members to recruit for security missions 
and/or to train and deploy in economic ventures.  So 
leaders often find it difficult to move to alignments and 
positions that are very far from the motivations of their 
memberships.  
 
Figure 2 - Architecture for a Highly Usable FactionSim 
including DIME Experiment Dashboard, Smart 
Template of Reusable Archetypes, and PMESII 
Reporting Module 
 
FactionSim is well documented in the literature and 
that won’t be repeated here: e.g., see Silverman et al 
(2007a, b). It also has attained a level of maturity. For 
example, it was used in 2006 to model 7 factions of Iraq 
with over two dozen named leaders and many 
archetypical followers (top layer of Figure 1). That 
implementation was successfully tested and approved 
for realism by a group of SMEs that DARPA assembled 
for two weeks at one of the military COMs. As of this 
writing and for all of 2008, FactionSim is being used 
under DARPA sponsorship to assemble profiles and 
models of all the major factions of 15 countries around 
the Pacific Rim. Part of that effort is looking into 
automating the generation of factional models. As part 
of a separate AFOSR effort we are studying how 
various theories of insurgency may be implemented 
within FactionSim.  
2.2) Agent Cognition: PMFserv 
Beginning in 1999, our lab has developed a human 
behavior model called Performance Moderator 
Function Server (PMFserv) that includes: (a) a 
synthesis of about 100 best-of-breed models of 
personality, culture, values, emotions, stress, social 
relations, group dynamics, as well as (b) an IDE for 
authoring and managing reusable archetypes and their 
task-sets.     
The unifying architecture in Figure 3 shows how 
different subsystems of PMFserv are connected. For 
each agent, PMFserv operates what is sometimes 
known as an observe, orient, decide, and act (OODA) 
loop (Osinga 2006). PMFserv runs the agent’s 
perception (observe) and then orients all the entire 
physiology and personality/value system to determine 
levels of fatigues and hunger, injuries and related 
stressors (Janis and Mann, 1977), grievances, tension 
buildup, impact of rumors and speech acts, emotions 
(Ortony, Clore and Collins, 1988) and various 
mobilizations and social relationship changes since the 
last tick of the simulator clock. Once all these modules 
and their parameters are oriented to the current 
stimuli/inputs, the upper right module (decision-
making/cognition) runs a best response algorithm to try 
to determine or decide what to do next. The algorithm it 
runs is determined by its stress and emotional levels. In 
optimal times, it is in vigilant mode and runs a 
subjective expected utility algorithm that reinvokes all 
the other modules to assess what impact each potential 
next step might have on its internal parameters. The 
agent calculates the subjective expected utility (SEU) it 
expects to derive from every action available to it, as 
constrained by perception and chooses the alternative 
that maximizes SEU.  Thus 
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Best Response (SEU) :                                                         (1) 
Max {Σ U (ak)*Pr (ak)* Φ (rj) + ψ}    
 
where utilities (U) for next actions, ak, are the 
anticipated E|S|P (Economy, Security, Politics) tank 
gains or losses the actions afford combined with how 
those affect the agent’s value system. Φ (rj) is a 
function that captures the strength of positive and 
negative relationships one has with agent or object j 
that are effected or spared by ak, and ψ handles merging 
and discounting (decay) prior action’s affect on the 
agent’s value system. When very bored, the agent tends 
to lose focus (perception degrades) and it runs a 
decision algorithm known as unconflicted adherence 
mode. When highly stressed, it will reach panic mode, 
its perception basically shuts down and it can only do 
one of two things: cower in place or drop everything 
and flee. In order to instantiate or parameterize these 
modules and models, PMFserv requires that the 
developer profile individuals in terms of each of the 
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module’s parameters (physiology, stress thresholds, 
value system, social relationships, etc.). Some of these 
features will be discussed in subsequent sections in 
explaining how the InsurgiSim agents reason about 
their missions. 
PMFserv is in use by an intelligence agency to 
model diplomatic decisions of world leaders for which 
it has passed statistical correspondence tests showing it 
is significantly in agreement with their decision-
making: see Silverman et al. (2007a). PMFserv has also 
reached the level where it can realistically simulate 
ethno-political conflicts among regional leaders and 
their followers vying over control of contested 
resources and assets (published validation studies for 
application in the Far East, MidEast Africa, and 
domestically are in Silverman et al 2006a, b, 2007b.  
FactionSim makes use of PMFserv to run both leader 
and follower agents and to use their micro-decision 
making to study group dynamics and how macro-
behaviors and new equilibria autonomously emerge. 
This is useful for studying the impact of actions and 
effects (DIME-PMESII) both from analytical as well as 
training and rehearsal perspectives. 
 
Figure 3 – PMFserv, an example Cognitive 
Architecture 
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3) InsurgiSim Overview: 
InsurgiSIM is a human-trainer tunable, 
autonomous insurgency force (leader, followers, 
missions and daily life, etc) that you can play against. It 
is intended for plugin to a multi-player game world, 
first person shooter, or in a wargame such as one of the 
US military’s Semi-Automated Forces (SAF) 
environments to study tactics, observables, and effects-
based operations and issues. Many of these worlds 
include adversaries but the AI is such that either they 
use a scripted finite state machine approach useful for 
force-on-force symmetrical encounters or else a human 
red team is expected to play out the asymmetric force’s 
roles. This is time consuming and expensive. A prime 
objective of the InsurgiSim project is to provide an 
autonomous, culturally realistic, sentient insurgent 
force to drive the reasoning of the agent avatars in such 
a game world.   
Looking back at earlier Figure 1 and as discussed 
in Sect. 2, FactionSim runs PMFserv agents as the 
insurgent leaders that populate the top layer of that 
diagram – the faction layer. In 2006, we added a 
second, more tactical layer – the cell layer. To do this 
we built several further archetypes of PMFserv agents 
that can be configured as an insurgent cell as shown at 
the base of Figure 1. That is, we developed reusable 
archetypes of a threat network of agents (e.g., 
logistician, diverse followers, and soon- to-be-added 
bomb maker, financier, recruiter, etc.), world markups 
(e.g., safe houses, VBIEDs, mosques, FOBs, etc), and 
mission scenarios in a graphical environment. These 
sentient agents have a daily routine (live, eat, pray, 
meet, etc.) and live amongst the rest of the populace. 
They have culturally appropriate values, emotions, 
stressors, and the like. We discuss them further in the 
next several subsections. First we examine the 
strategies of the faction leader who deploys them as a 
loose hierarchy or network of adversaries to the force-
for-order. It should be noted that InsurgiSim’s strategic 
and cell layers were each built separately as stand-alone 
elements in 2006 – the strategic layer for DARPA and 
the cell layer for embedding inside the JointSAF or 
JSAF environment to assist a red cell of the Urban 
Resolve effort. Since that time we have merged the two 
components into a unified architecture and in 2008 we 
are embedding it in a virtual village for the USMC. 
Rather than worry about historical details, in the 
remainder of this article we will discuss all applications 
as if they are the unified one. 
 
3.1) Strategic Layer 
One selects the faction that is ideologically leading 
the cells and profiles and instantiates its leader. For 
example, a named Jihadist leader or imam, a 
charismatic guerilla, or a separatist. The faction leader 
carries out the overall campaign against the other 
factions, and in the present architecture is the primary 
source for recruiting new insurgents and other support 
to his cause. As described in Sect. 2.1, the faction 
leader uses its decision making to decide operations 
such as non-violent protests, psyops campaigns, 
economic ventures, defensive efforts, and so on. It does 
not closely control the cells, but it does signal when it 
thinks another faction should be attacked. If the cell 
carries out a successful attack, the factional leader also 
has the means to publicize this and generally will. 
Central to a given leader’s value system reasoning 
is its perception of who threatens it and/or whom it’s 
vulnerable to.  Likewise a given leader may be equally 
interested to estimate who can it influence to best 
increase its resource assets and thereby its power in the 
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world. Obviously, individual leader value system 
weights will govern how aggressively a given leader 
pursues each of these vulnerability vs. power concerns, 
however, we assume that all leader agents need to be 
able to compute how vulnerable and/or powerful they 
are at each turn of a game. Since the game rules define 
precisely which resources can be used to take hostile 
actions against which other resources, one can derive a 
measure of a player’s vulnerability directly from the 
state of the game world and the rule set.  Intuitively, by 
factoring vulnerability into the world utility calculation, 
an agent can avoid world configurations in which 
another is poised to conduct a devastating attack.  
Adding border defenses, stocking up on supplies, and 
pulling money out of the economy can all be viewed as 
behaviors motivated primarily by vulnerability 
management. 
       The vulnerability formula (β) works by generating 
the percentage of a given player’s tokens that can be 
expected to be lost to a given player in the coming 
round of attack actions (ai). For each hostile action (ai є 
A) that can be initiated by another player (g), the 
number of tokens available to attack and defend is 
tallied. From this the probability of victory is 
determined, and then multiplied by the percentage of 
tokens vulnerable to this attack versus the total number 
owned by the vulnerable player in each resource 
category. This is the expected percentage of tokens to 
be lost if this attack occurs in the next round. The 
maximum over all attacks, then, gives this player ℓ’s 
vulnerability score β to player y. 
( ) ( )( )xC
a,xaPrAaMaxxy σ∗∈=β                        (2) 
        Agents who purely manage vulnerability, while 
interesting in their behavior, are not entirely realistic.  
Human players tend to balance vulnerability against its 
inverse, power.  Where vulnerability measures the 
expected number of tokens a player can lose to other 
players in the coming round, power measures the 
expected number of tokens a player can take from 
others.  The calculation of the power heuristic is exactly 
the opposite as for vulnerability.  Player A’s 
vulnerability to Player B is the same as Player B’s 
power over Player A.   
      Taking the leader’s perceived difference between 
power and vulnerability provides a surrogate for the 
leader’s overall sense of utility of the current state of 
the world, G, when divorced from his value system and 
other factors: 
Ul (Gx) = αx – βx                                               (3) 
In standalone FactionSim games there is no spatial 
graphics or 3_D representation. The insurgent faction’s 
security forces are simply poker chips that the leader 
decides to wager on a militaristic venture against 
another faction. In those games the battle outcomes are 
decided in a contest held by the game engine (using 
random coin flips for each poker chip played against 
another faction’s defenses). By building the cell layer 
of Figure 1, we are endowing a third party game world 
an ability to conduct and display the actual operations.  
 
3.2) Tactical Decision Layer 
To begin, a training developer decides how many 
cells to place under the factional leader and populate 
the game world with. For each cell, a GUI editor 
(Figure 4) allows one to rapidly setup alternative 
configurations and types of insurgency forces and 
mission parameters, depending on what is desired for 
combat studies and training efforts.  For a given cell, 
the upper right of Figure 3 shows the types of missions 
one can currently allow the cell to undertake (chosen 
based on training needs). And one can check off 
whether PMFserv should play the cell logistician or if a 
human should play it instead.  
 
Figure 4 – Insurgent Cell Starting Configuration Panel 
 
The PMFserv cell logistician does not coordinate with 
the faction leader, but is a follower and will tend to 
respond to intermittent, high level guidance such as 
whether to attack another faction or not. When it 
responds to such signals, the PMFserv logistician is not 
scripted, but uses its perception and value system to 
decide everything such as what specific missions to 
undertake, when to do them, specific assets of the 
opponent to target, who to assign them to, and when to 
lay low. It constantly reassesses the expected utility of 
each course of action relative to its value system and by 
also making use of the same type of power and 
vulnerability computations as mentioned earlier (but for 
a narrower span of control). Because it uses its own 
individualized cognition, it is possible that a given cell 
logistician may be more or less aggressive than the 
factional leader had hoped. Its also possible for it to be 
stressed and to commit errors and react emotively. 
 
3.3) Mission Layer 
The left hand side of Figure 4 allows the training 
developer to alter the quantity and mix of types of 
footsoldiers to include in the cell at the start of the 
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simulation. These invoke different archetypes within 
PMFserv. At one extreme are those most loyal to the 
cause and willing to undertake any mission even a 
suicide bombing. At the other extreme are more 
conventional fighters, possibly even those who are 
coerced into missions. These latter tend to be new 
recruits and are the most likely to decide not to do a 
given mission assigned by the cell logistician. For 
example, on the right side of Figure 4, the extreme 
Radical Agent can be seen to value the safehouse and 
emplaced IEDs more highly than the average Fighter 
Agent does (left side). Likewise the Fighter agent 
seems to see many daily life routines as having positive 
utility – going to place of worship, recreation, etc. 
These are utilities at the start of a random run. 
 
Figure 4 -  How Two Different Foot Soldiers Differ in 
Their Assessment of the Utility of Various Missions 
Utility calculations come from an agent summing 
its positive and negative emotional arousals relative to 
how the world state is causing success and/or failure of 
the values it feels are important. Figure 5 illustrates this 
“cognitive appraisal” of the world with the right hand 
side depicting a portion of the Asymmetric Fighter 
agent’s value system and its importance weights. The 
left side indicates an agent that is highly distressed, 
angered, and disliking of the world state. Figure 4b 
shows an agent right after conducting a mission (IED 
emplacement and detonation), and the positive 
emotional construals that precipitates. 
 This discussion points out that the foot soldiers of 
the cell live at the safehouse which happens to be at the 
upper right of Figure 5b. They are the squares in green. 
Yellow circles with stars inside are potential targets that 
the logistician might communicate with a mission 
assignment, while rectangles (blue) are the forces for 
order in this environment. The explosion symbol at the 
base of Figure 5b designates a successful IED mission 
that destroyed a bridge, some adversaries, and some 
civilians. The popup window shows the PMFserv view 
into the head of the agent that carried out the IED 
mission 
 
Figure 5a – Shred of a Bayesian-Weighted Value 
Hierarchy and the Emotions it Precipitates 
 
 
5b – How conducting a mission alters an agent’s 
emotional state 
 
 
The bottom of the Figure 5b popup also lists the 
missions currently being carried out by all the agents of 
the cell. One can see that many of the cell members are 
in fact doing daily life activities. Based on their utility 
calculations of the world state, agents may opt to do 
missions from the cell leader or not. Further, even if an 
agent accepts a mission, these other missions (daily life 
routines) are still options that it may return to. When 
carrying out a mission, an agent may pause it to do 
something else, resume later, or abort altogether. Thus 
it might pause when carrying an IED from the 
safehouse to a car if the blue forces are noticed outside, 
and then resume after they move on. The decision to 
start a mission, pause, resume, or abort is up to the 
individual agent and is based on its re-assessment of its 
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strength of group affinity (membership level), 
congruence with the value system and action choices of 
the group leader, and concern for its own safety and 
other values. As membership and congruence grow or 
fall, the agent will alter its loyalty and willingness to 
undertake assigned missions. Or it may abort a given 
mission altogether due to lack of commitment to the 
group and concern for its own safety, and instead 
choose to go eat some food, meet a friend, etc. 
 
4) Inter-Operation with External Simulators 
 InsurgiSim is intended to drive the behavior of 
agents in 3rd party simulators. PMFserv has previously 
been embedded behind a number of applications, 
gameworlds, and simulators – e.g., Unreal, Sony 
OpenSteer, Big World, a diplomacy game engine 
(Athena’s Prism), OneSAF, and JSAF. Such 
implementations generally work with a Bridge or 
Gateway program that links PMFserv (or InsurgiSim) 
and the 3rd party simulator. Here we illustrate the latter 
of these interoperation efforts by explaining the 
PMFserv side, the bridge, and finally the JSAF side. 
 
4.1) PMFserv Sim Side Services Layer 
 PMFServ has been designed to be easily leveraged 
by external simulators to provide human PMFs.  
Because the domain and resolution of simulations using 
PMFserv services can vary greatly PMFserv was 
designed to be domain agnostic.   PMFserv uses a 
simple interchange mechanism to allow its models to 
interact and be driven by external simulations.  This 
interchange mechanism is simple enough that it can be 
developed on a per simulation basis.   
The reader may recall that each PMFserv 
simulation contains agents and a series of objects that 
the agents can perceive and make decisions about. This 
collection of objects represents the “World” that the 
agents inhabit.   The objects contain rules that drive 
how an agent perceives them in terms of his value 
system. PMFserv’s integrated development 
environment (IDE) provides the tools needed for 
composing these objects.  A running version of 
PMFserv remains until an external simulation makes a 
change to a PMFserv object.   Once an object has had 
its state changed PMFServer reacts to the change by 
updating all of the agents who can observe the change. 
This results in an Agent’s physiology, perceptions, 
stress, emotions and decisions being updated. These 
new updated agents are immediately available to affect 
external agents as PMFServ’s “Performance 
Moderators”.    
 The state information that is shared between 
PMFserv and an external simulation is determined 
during the knowledge engineering phase of 
development.  For example if you are modeling a car in 
PMFserv you might include information about its 
current speed and direction. You might event want to 
include something as esoteric as what the car’s bumper 
sticker says.  This depends on what is determined to be 
relevant to the perceptual types and affordances that 
capture the behaviors and culture that pertains to the 
simulation’s domain. Once you have modeled an object 
in PMFServ, an external simulation can access this 
object at runtime. This means a racing simulation could 
share state information between one of its ‘cars’ and the 
one modeled in PMFServ. 
 
4.2) Interchange Layer and Bridge Services  
External simulators and InsurgiSim will generally 
be asynchronous and operate on differing time-scales. 
A key service of the bridge is to facilitate this 
asynchrony so that each side is only notified when 
changes occur that are significant to that side (publish 
and subscribe pattern). Via a simple exchange of 
property and value information InsurgiSim models can 
thus provide PMFs to a wide range of simulation 
architectures without major changes to its code base. 
Another service of the bridge layer is to support 
translation lookup tables. These are authored at setup 
time. They contain translations between InsurgiSim’s 
parameters (e.g., name, value, units, aggregation, etc.) 
and those of the third party simulator. 
To support such services, we have defined an 
interface layer between InsurgiSim and any 3rd party 
simulators, using a global blackboard and a simple 
synchronization loop.  Each agent has methods which 
both check desirable InsurgiSim parameters and 
execute motions and graphics on the selected platform 
and application.  Thus we need to define the parameter 
sets and the protocols to set, query, and update state of 
mutual interest to both InsurgiSim and the human 
display models.  It needs to be bi-directional since low-
level activities (navigation, perceptions, threats, 
injuries, etc.) can clearly affect PMFs. 
 The Bridge communicates with JSAF using HLA 
and with InsurgiSim using XML-RPC (see Figure 5).  
InsurgiSim exposes the properties of its objects via an 
API.  This API allows a simulation to both set state and 
retrieve state from any PMFserv agent or object. 
Because of the loop’s simplicity, InsurgiSim can be 
used with a multitude of disparate simulators.  Using 
this bridge approach, PMFserv has been synchronized 
with external simulations via Microsoft’s COM (Unreal 
Tournament), the HLA/RTI protocol, and TCP/IP 
(LeaderSim project). Another application of PMFserv 
similar to InsurgiSim is called CrowdSim and it has 
used this same bridge architecture to interface PMFserv 
agents to drive behaviors of crowd members in 
Python’s C-API (opensteer crowd model), DARPA’s 
Real World, JSAF, and OneSAF. The interchange 
choice  is  highly dependent on the external simulation 
and its own internal simulation loop. The 
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nature/number of state information exchanges that are 
necessary to support the accompanying PMFServ 
Model and the native enviroment of the external 
simulation also play a large roll in the development of 
the a synchronization loop.  
 
Figure 6: The Bridge Approach to Embed InsurgiSim 
 
 
A generic synchronization loop is:  
1. External simulation calls InsurgiSim and informs it 
of a state change. Alternatively InsurgiSim could 
poll an external Simulation for pertinent state 
information. 
2. InsurgiSim processes this new information and 
updates its agents. 
3.    The external simulation requests any PMF 
Moderator variables that it uses. 
4. The external simulation uses the new information 
to moderate itself. 
5. New external simulation state forces the loop to 
repeat. 
 This bridge is portable and can be placed to reduce 
latency. As Figure 6 shows, InsurgiSim currently runs 
on any MS Windows platform. It is written in a 
portable Python, but certain of its security admin 
functions are currently tied to MS operating systems. 
JSAF, in turn, is optimized to run under Linux. Since 
JSAF updates its state in real-time and InsurgiSim is 
needed less frequently (but runs faster than real time 
when invoked), the messaging flow was optimized by 
placing the bridge on the Linux platform with JSAF. 
 
4.3) JSAF Layer Services  
To coordinate JSAF with InsurgiSim (and its two 
software servers for this project  RedLarry and Leader), 
the Bridge needs to synchronize JSAF entities with 
InsurgiSim agents, forward user configuration (safe 
houses, ICs, targets, etc) from JSAF to InsurgiSim, and 
finally translate each agent's high-level decisions into 
concrete JSAF entity tasks. Therefore, to communicate 
with JSAF, the Bridge is also an HLA federate.  As 
Figure 7 reveals, it subscribes to InsurgiSim control 
interactions and publishes JSAF task interactions.  
Specifically, when a human operator inputs information 
into the PMFServ Orders menu (it is called PMFserv in 
the JSAF menu structure), JSAF sends a corresponding 
interaction to the Bridge.  Through these interactions, 
users can constrain and alter missions along with their 
parameters (e.g. objects, vehicles, or weapons) and as 
earlier Figure 1 portrays. The Bridge also detects and 
forwards dynamic environment information that may 
affect an InsurgiSim agent's decision (such as the 
number of enemy or blue units in the immediate 
vicinity of a JSAF agent/entity). 
As the Leader and Red Larry (which hosts the 
foot soldiers) agents make decisions, the Bridge 
controls their corresponding JSAF entities via task 
interactions, such as "move to building X" and "mount 
vehicle Y".  That is, our Leader Server runs FactionSim 
and the Logistician Agent who picks out the missions 
for the Red Larry foot soldiers. They in turn decide how 
to carry out these missions, the phases or task steps 
needed, when daily life routines are warranted, when to 
abort, and so on. They also monitor how well their 
corresponding JSAF entities are doing in executing 
these tasks.  Finally, when an InsurgiSim agent has 
made a choice, the Bridge translates it to JSAF's virtual 
world. Therefore, to synchronize the decisions from 
InsurgiSim with the tasks in JSAF, the Bridge must 
continuously monitor the tasking status of both 
InsurgiSim agents and JSAF entities.  Users can learn 
what orders InsurgiSim has issued by looking at the 
messages passed between the Leader, the Red Larry 
agents, and the Bridge. 
 
Figure 7: Message Flows for the JSAF Federation 
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5) Conclusions and Next Steps 
 This article has described a reusable insurgent 
force simulator that allows one to test different theories 
of insurgency and plug them into a 3rd party simulator 
to drive the insurgent avatars and to play against them 
for training or analysis purposes.  The theories 
contained in the default version of InsurgiSim straddle 
individual psycho-physiological ones (stress, emotion, 
sacred values, etc.) as well as social ones (belonging, 
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mobilization and grievance, group membership, 
motivational congruence). One can edit these starting 
theories with the internal editors of FactionSim and 
PMFserv. As such, InsurgiSim serves as a successful 
proof-of-existence test for socio-cognitive agent 
architecture. 
 The first version of InsurgiSim’s cell layer was 
completed and fielded at the end of 2006 as part of the 
Urban Resolve testbed: see Ceranowicz & Torpey (2004). 
Its role there was to support the red team so they did not 
have to operate every foot soldier and decide every 
mission. The first version of InsurgiSim’s strategic 
layer was also fielded in 2006 as part of an initiative to 
assemble a country model of Iraq. Other country 
models are now under construction. 
 In addition, we have plugged InsurgiSim into two 
other applications. The screen shots of Bagdad shown 
in this article are not JSAF, but are those of a test 
harness we built in MS Windows. The only entities in 
this world are the InsurgiSim agents, and they are 
embodied only within a 2-D or plan level viewer.  This 
does allow us to view their decision making and 
movement around the terrain.   
 All layers of InsurgiSim are being unified and put 
to use as part of a virtual village we are currently 
assembling for the US Marine Corp. Called NonKin 
Village, this is a gameworld that brings life to agents of 
all factions of FactionSim in sort of a SimCity style of 
play although it supports street level interaction and 
dialog with agents to learn their issues, needs, 
grievances, and alignments and to try to assist them in 
countering the agenda of the InsurgiSim faction. If you 
mis-manage the situation, various factions and 
members might be drawn to the insurgent faction’s 
side. 
 
5.1) Next Steps 
 To support InsurgiSim, we successfully 
implemented first versions of several features that are 
now open for further research. In fact, there are a host 
of further research directions that a project like 
InsurgiSim opens up. We mention but a few of these 
here.  
(1) Terrain Reasoning – PMFServ and InsurgiSim 
currently reason about the terrain from a mission-level 
perspective (e.g., consider relevant locations, select 
targets, and think up what supplies to bring where). 
This nicely complements JSAF entities’ ability to 
navigate to points in the environment, move around, 
avoid collisions, aim and fire weapons, etc. FactionSim 
leaders, on the other hand reason strategically about 
each faction’s relative strength, assets, and point of 
vulnerability. In the present JSAF version, strategic 
reasoning is wasted since the terrain data is devoid of 
up-to-date information on which factions control what 
assets and what condition they are in. The same applies 
to the populace identities and factional memberships, 
and to the economic status of each faction. Projects like 
the Army’s Human Terrain program hold the potential 
to alter how country databases are marked up with 
things like property ownership, socio-economic status 
and value of various assets, and factional leanings of 
the populace. We think FactionSim offers guidance on 
what those markups should provide and offers a rich 
base for exploring how agent based reasoning about 
terrain would use it.  
(2) Campaign Reasoning – the InsurgiSim agents at all 
levels (strategic, tactical, and mission) do not come up 
with new plans. Instead, they are able to use emotions 
and value systems to reason about and select between 
alternative plans, missions, and life routines and for 
which group to do them. Also, PMFserv has built in 
functions for agents to form a model of other (MOO) 
agents. This is based on a technique of mirroring one’s 
value system through an alignment matrix to determine 
the other’s values. Mirroring is a human bias and often 
leads to projecting inappropriate assumptions about the 
motivations of others. Hence it is of interest to see 
where this type of MOO and other more rational MOO 
approaches lead the agents. These and other forms of 
campaign reasoning are worth exploring further.  
(3) Theory of Insurgency/Terrorism – As stated at the 
outset, the default version of InsurgiSim comes with 
built in theories of insurgency and terrorism based on 
social-psychological models of sacred values and 
ethno-political factional grievance as well as more 
materialistic greed concerns such as control of 
resources. A big part of the reason for constructing 
InsurgiSim the way we did atop a socio-cognitive agent 
framework is so that one has a theory testbed with 
which to conduct studies of how people’s behavior 
shifts as different theories are attempted and as varying 
policies for mitigation are pursued. One alternative 
theory we have begun investigating is the dual sector 
model of a developing economy. Many other such 
theories merit study as well.  
(4) Cultural Bridge – At present the bridge provides 
translation services limited by the few character 
animations that are often found inside of the 3-D 
gameworlds. PMFserv pumps out parameters about 
emotive, physiologic, and motivational state that few 3-
D viewers in the military domain are able to animate. 
To make matters worse, the ideal translation table 
should suggest changes in gestural and communicative 
acts that are relevant for the culture being gamed. That 
is, if PMFserv outputs a warm greeting request, this 
translation could invoke the proper gestures and terms 
to utter for the relevant culture. This is feasible, but it 
needs someone to research and assemble all the parts. 
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